Media and press freedom in Japan

Upload: 22 July 2019, Last update: 5 September 2019

Japan’s media is not independent enough.

According to the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, the transition of Japan’s press freedom ranking from 2010 to 2019 is as follows.

	Japan	Source
2019	67	[1]
2018	67	[2]
2017	72	[3]
2016	72	[4]
2015	61	[5]
2014	59	[6]
2013	53	[7]
2011-2012	22	[8]
2010	11	[9]

The UN special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression Mr. David Kaye —“… the UN Human Rights Council appointed … “[10] “in August 2014″[11]—came to Japan “from 12 to 19 April 2016″[12], his original visit scheduled in December 2015 was canceled because the government was busy with “budgeting season”[13].

Especially in his report[14] and a press conference at Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan (FCCJ) on 19 April 2016[15], David Kaye pointed out many issues Japan have while mentioning that Japan has “a high degree of freedom online”[16] and “presents an important model in the area of freedom on the Internet”[17].

One of the concerns Japan’s media have is Kisha club system. Japan’s media in general has strong aspect of access journalism. For reporters of major news corporations, Kisha club is useful to get information directly from authorities, but I think this is a reason that main stream media is dependent on this structure and Japan’s media has strong tendency of access journalism. Authorities benefits since major media companies convey their perspectives to the public. Both major companies and authorities, it helps for giving information from authorities perspective and posing questions and getting information directly in terms of reporters, but there’s room for improvement for maximizing public interests. In particular, it should allow people working in journalism not belonging to non-major media companies to participate equally. In Japan, Chief Cabinet Secretary or Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary participates in press conference every weekday. This seems facilitating the right to know of the public, but I do think the quality of its press conference matters and has to be ameliorated.

With regard to the structure of TV broadcasting, the current structure that Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) can suspend the broadcasting of TV stations must be abolished. On 8 February, 2016, in the budgeting committee of the House of Representatives, the then Minister of MIC, Sanae Takaichi didn’t deny the possibility of suspending it[18].

It seems to me that the obedience of Japanese media in general as well as citizens have negative aspects in journalism.

Footnotes

[1] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2019 Accessed 19 June 2019

[2] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2018 Accessed 19 June 2019

[3] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2017 Accessed 19 June 2019

[4] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2016 Accessed 19 June 2019

[5] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2015 Accessed 19 June 2019

[6] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2014 Accessed 19 June 2019

[7] https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2013 Accessed 19 June 2019

[8] https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-20112012 Accessed 19 June 2019. https://rsf.org/fr/actualites/le-classement-2 Accessed 19 June 2019

[9] https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-2010 Accessed 19 June 2019

[10] Kaye, D. (2019). Speech Police: The Global Struggle to Govern the Internet. p131

[11] https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomopinion/pages/davidkaye.aspx Accessed 26 August 2019

[12] Freedom of Opinion and Expression – Annual reports. Symbol Number: A/HRC/35/22/Add.1. Title: Addendum: Mission to Japan. Accessed 19 June 2019. p.2

[13] David Kaye’s press conference at The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on 19 April 2016. The video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4Ldjp9XegI Accessed 19 June 2019. 57:50-

[14] A/HRC/35/22/Add.1.

[15] David Kaye’s press conference at The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on 19 April 2016. The video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4Ldjp9XegI Accessed 19 June 2019.

[16] A/HRC/35/22/Add.1. p5. And in his FCCJ press conference he touched on this point as well.

[17] A/HRC/35/22/Add.1. p17

[18]http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_kaigirokua.nsf/html/kaigirokua/001819020160208009.htm Accessed 27 July 2019