2.2 Freedom

The reason for protecting freedom is partly that it is related to the autonomy of citizens. Citizens have to be more autonomously thinking of their communities, for instance coronavirus pandemic questioned democracy as the world got more centralized without citizens’ autonomy. For example, not denying their request to public funding, it is not so much desirable to be dependent on government. Provided independency from government in domain of art should be maintained for some artists in the long run. Or when crisis comes, it is not the case that all the assistance is provided by government, instead autonomous cooperation of citizens should be cultivated. Asking for the government to provide support can take time and it is not sure if that is truly done, the alliance of the citizenry can be one of the polars that helps them. Having said that, making demands against government is also one option. When it comes to pandemic, the communities should think about governance, autonomy, and the like. This is not to waste a period of history in which the earliers have faced difficulty. On autonomy, it doesn’t make sense if people do not make action unless authorities give orders to them. The community they create which for example supports the businesses which is at stake when crisis comes, or provides, even if it is somewhat, support from the citizens of the same community helps the community to get through the difficult period. What is supposed here is that some businesses may not get affected than others, they help others. This kind of support among the citizenry can generate resilience and robustness.

Autonomy is essential to create the democratic culture. Citizens should think by themselves to accomplish the desirable society. Though some would be reluctant to make action, at least enough people need to participate in politics if society makes their politics participatory. While putting importance in the autonomy of citizens, some would feel more comfortable to be obedient towards their society, that means that they would not much prefer to make actions. And it is not always necessary to make it participatory or active as far as the ways through which some who are eager to claim their political opinions can have access to their politics are ensured. To put it different way, people who do not prefer to be active in politics are not denied access to politics, they just choose not to actively make action at the moment, but having their access in their hands. Securing the sphere in which one is autonomously live in their lives would counter against the moments at which authority excessively attempt to exercise their power into the lives of people. In order to prevent the abuse of power among the few, autonomous groups with their freedom protected need to freely act so that a few groups of power which want to hold their interests don’t abuse their powers for their private interests. As for the authority given to those who are in power, they have responsibility to the decisions they make, on social institutions, “even if rights and powers giving some people a measure of control over others must be a feature of any plausible system of social institutions, the way in which these rights and powers are distributed is one of the features of social institutions that is most subject to criticism and most in need of justification”(1). Benefit of freedom is not to impose coercive pressure on its citizens, and let them have space to practically behave in their wishful way. The sphere of free is wider, the sphere in which persons can act is secured.

While many believe that freedom is one of the fundamental domains that should be protected, we need to be aware of the aspect of freedom that it is not absolute. It is not what can always be prioritised over others.

Here, we take into consideration the contingent nature of freedom. This nature of contingency upon others is what I shed light on. This contingency of freedom upon others is closely tied with the fact that we live in society where other people also live. This fact of living together with other people have certain effect on the exercise of one’s freedom. Just because people recognise the importance of protection of freedom doesn’t mean that each of us can exercise their own rights and freedom in whatever manner they want. There are cases that one should care about others when they exercise their freedom, that is to say, freedom needs to be taken consideration in the relationship with others.

The following example concisely describes this type of situation. The contingency of freedom is described by Lawrence Lessing in the following example: “I may have a house on a farm. Imagine that every year, I have a large and loud birthday party. But imagine that, partly to pay for those parties, every year I sell off plots of land on my farm. And imagine that eventually all I have is my house, surrounded by lots of other houses”(2). He continues that “That change may have restricted the freedom that I formerly had”(3). Since selling off the parts of land makes closer the distance with neighbours, the landowner mentioned above needs more likely to care about neighbours in exercising one’s freedom. This example represents the contingent aspect of freedom.

This nature of freedom that it is contingent upon others is what triggers to look at the importance of thinking about others in society. The argument above informs us of the fact that our society is interrelated and the concept of freedom is no exception. And freedom is not what is absolutely prioritised over others. This leads to look at the development of sentiment within oneself in the later section where I focus on the concept.

There are different principles to think about freedom. One of them is the “principle of non-nuisance” which was in discussion(4). It has the element of the care about others when exercising their rights.

The harm principle includes the standard whether it causes harm to others or not and it cares the relationship of one’s act with others. It is described that “the principle of harm: I am at liberty to move my hands until I hit my neighbour’s nose, at which point I cause her harm and therefore am not at liberty to proceed”(5).

The more civilised, the rules are piled up in the societies which narrows the actions of the people. Although human beings don’t have to try to forget the lessons that they learned from the past history, we don’t have to comply with all the rules that are continuously established, beyond necessity. It could lose flexibility, agility, and capacity of innovation from ourselves.

A progress originates in the sphere in which one can expand the conventional norms and cultures, and one should focus on the progress which brings about the happiness of persons, rather than the one which brings, for example, wealth to certain groups of people in the same community.

Besides, to preserve the free sphere in which the rigid conformity doesn’t affect, it lets people to develop individuality. It contributes in the way that “In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others”(6).

It is when one accomplishes their target, they gain freedom, by which they can decide what they are going to do. In that case, they have a variety of possible choices. Trying to be free is still not being free, as it is bound by the forces of desire to get free. In this respect, being free gives one a hope. Freedom would be realized at least partly, when society as a whole provides diverse range of options. Not putting the same societal structure over the world, but coexisting multiple styles of society in the world.

(1) T. M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 43.

(2) Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 97-98.

(3) Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 98.

(4) François Héran, Lettre aux professeurs sur la liberté d’expression (Paris: La Découverte, 2021), pp. 102-103.

(5) Amnon Reichman, ‘Criminalizing Religiously Offensive Satire: Free Speech, Human Dignity, and Comparative Law’, in Extreme Speech and Democracy, edited by Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 331-354. This is explained by Amnon Reichman in p.333.

(6) John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and The Subjection of Women (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 72.

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